Philosophy and Logic: Epistemology

Epistemology

Epistemology - By Branch / Doctrine - The Basics of Philosophy

Epistemology is the study of the nature and scope of knowledge and justified belief. It analyzes the nature of knowledge and how it relates to similar notions such as truth, belief and justification. It also deals with the means of production of knowledge, as well as skepticism about different knowledge claims. It is essentially about issues having to do with the creation and dissemination of knowledge in particular areas of inquiry.

Epistemology asks questions like: "What is knowledge?", "How is knowledge acquired?", "What do people know?", "What are the necessary and sufficient conditions of knowledge?", "What is its structure, and what are its limits?", "What makes justified beliefs justified?", "How we are to understand the concept of justification?", "Is justification internal or external to one's own mind?"

The kind of knowledge usually discussed in Epistemology is propositional knowledge, "knowledge-that" as opposed to "knowledge-how" (for example, the knowledge that "2 + 2 = 4", as opposed to the knowledge of how to go about adding two numbers).

What Is Knowledge?

Knowledge is the awareness and understanding of particular aspects of reality. It is the clear, lucid information gained through the process of reason applied to reality. The traditional approach is that knowledge requires three necessary and sufficient conditions, so that knowledge can then be defined as "justified true belief":

truth: since false propositions cannot be known - for something to count as knowledge, it must actually be true. As Aristotle famously (but rather confusingly) expressed it: "To say of something which is that it is not, or to say of something which is not that it is, is false. However, to say of something which is that it is, or of something which is not that it is not, is true."
belief: because one cannot know something that one doesn't even believe in, the statement "I know x, but I don't believe that x is true" is contradictory.
justification: as opposed to believing in something purely as a matter of luck.

The most contentious part of all this is the definition of justification, and there are several schools of thought on the subject:

According to Evidentialism, what makes a belief justified in this sense is the possession of evidence - a belief is justified to the extent that it fits a person's evidence.
Different varieties of Reliabilism suggest that either: 1) justification is not necessary for knowledge provided it is a reliably-produced true belief; or 2) justification is required but any reliable cognitive process (e.g. vision) is sufficient justification.
Yet another school, Infallibilism, holds that a belief must not only be true and justified, but that the justification of the belief must necessitate its truth, so that the justification for the belief must be infallible.

Another debate focuses on whether justification is external or internal:

Externalism holds that factors deemed "external" (meaning outside of the psychological states of those who are gaining the knowledge) can be conditions of knowledge, so that if the relevant facts justifying a proposition are external then they are acceptable.
Internalism, on the other hand, claims that all knowledge-yielding conditions are within the psychological states of those who gain knowledge.

As recently as 1963, the American philosopher Edmund Gettier called this traditional theory of knowledge into question by claiming that there are certain circumstances in which one does not have knowledge, even when all of the above conditions are met (his Gettier-cases). For example: Suppose that the clock on campus (which keeps accurate time and is well maintained) stopped working at 11:56pm last night, and has yet to be repaired. On my way to my noon class, exactly twelve hours later, I glance at the clock and form the belief that the time is 11:56. My belief is true, of course, since the time is indeed 11:56. And my belief is justified, as I have no reason to doubt that the clock is working, and I cannot be blamed for basing beliefs about the time on what the clock says. Nonetheless, it seems evident that I do not know that the time is 11:56. After all, if I had walked past the clock a bit earlier or a bit later, I would have ended up with a false belief rather than a true one.

How Is Knowledge Acquired?

Propositional knowledge can be of two types, depending on its source:

a priori (or non-empirical), where knowledge is possible independently of, or prior to, any experience, and requires only the use of reason (e.g. knowledge of logical truths and of abstract claims); or
a posteriori (or empirical), where knowledge is possible only subsequent, or posterior, to certain sensory experiences, in addition to the use of reason (e.g. knowledge of the color or shape of a physical object, or knowledge of geographical locations).

Knowledge of empirical facts about the physical world will necessarily involve perception, in other words, the use of the senses. But all knowledge requires some amount of reasoning, the analysis of data and the drawing of inferences. Intuition is often believed to be a sort of direct access to knowledge of the a priori.

Memory allows us to know something that we knew in the past, even, perhaps, if we no longer remember the original justification. Knowledge can also be transmitted from one individual to another via testimony (that is, my justification for a particular belief could amount to the fact that some trusted source has told me that it is true).

There are a few main theories of knowledge acquisition:

Empiricism, which emphasizes the role of experience, especially experience based on perceptual observations by the five senses in the formation of ideas, while discounting the notion of innate ideas. Refinements of this basic principle led to Phenomenalism, Positivism, Scientism and Logical Positivism.
Rationalism, which holds that knowledge is not derived from experience, but rather is acquired by a priori processes or is innate(in the form of concepts) or intuitive.
Representationalism (or Indirect Realism or Epistemological Dualism), which holds that the world we see in conscious experience is not the real world itself, but merely a miniature virtual-reality replica of that world in an internal representation.
Constructivism (or Constructionism), which presupposes that all knowledge is "constructed", in that it is contingent on convention, human perception and social experience.

What Can People Know?

The fact that any given justification of knowledge will itself depend on another belief for its justification appears to lead to an infinite regress.

Skepticism begins with the apparent impossibility of completing this infinite chain of reasoning, and argues that, ultimately, no beliefs are justified and therefore no one really knows anything.

Fallibilism also claims that absolute certainty about knowledge is impossible, or at least that all claims to knowledge could, in principle, be mistaken. Unlike Skepticism, however, Fallibilism does not imply the need to abandon our knowledge, just to recognize that, because empirical knowledge can be revised by further observation, any of the things we take as knowledge might possibly turn out to be false.

In response to this regress problem, various schools of thought have arisen:

Foundationalism claims that some beliefs that support other beliefs are foundational and do not themselves require justification by other beliefs (self-justifying or infallible beliefs or those based on perception or certain a priori considerations).
Instrumentalism is the methodological view that concepts and theories are merely useful instruments, and their worth is measured by how effective they are in explaining and predicting phenomena. Instrumentalism therefore denies that theories are truth-evaluable. Pragmatism is a similar concept, which holds that something is trueonly insofar as it works and has practical consequences.
Infinitism typically takes the infinite series to be merely potential, and an individual need only have the ability to bring forth the relevant reasons when the need arises. Therefore, unlike most traditional theories of justification, Infinitism considers an infinite regress to be a valid justification.
Coherentism holds that an individual belief is justified circularly by the way it fits together (coheres) with the rest of the belief system of which it is a part, so that the regress does not proceed according to a pattern of linear justification.
Foundherentism is another position which is meant to be a unification of foundationalism and coherentism.

Major Doctrines

Under the heading of Epistemology, the major doctrines or theories include:

Epistemology - By Branch / Doctrine - The Basics of Philosophy

https://www.philosophybasics.com/branch_epistemology.html

Epistemology is the theory of knowledge. It is concerned with the mind’s relation to reality. What is it for this relation to be one of knowledge? Do we know things? And if we do, how and when do we know things? These questions, and so the field of epistemology, is as old as philosophy itself. Answering these questions requires considering the relationship between knowledge, truth, belief, reason, evidence and reliability. It requires considering the different psychological routes to knowledge, including different processes of reasoning – logical and scientific – introspection, perception, memory, testimony and intuition. And it requires considering the nature of the known reality: How we know our own minds differs from how we know the minds of others; social realities are differently known to mental ones; the route to scientific knowledge is different to the route to mathematical knowledge; and moral knowledge is not merely factual. And throughout these debates there is the constant undercurrent of scepticism, which suggests that we can never know the reality behind appearances.

The field of epistemology is thus now a vast one with numerous research areas and issues. Sheffield has an established excellence in a wide range of these areas. We received research grants to work on the epistemology of testimony, the value, rationality, and normativity of trust, the education and the civic significance of intellectual virtues. We have received grants to put on conferences on the philosophy of trust and transcendental responses to scepticism. We have a particularly keen interest in the more social dimensions of epistemology, and in the interconnections between the moral and the epistemic.

Both James Lenman and Max Khan Hayward have worked on moral epistemology, the relationship between moral and epistemic values and the way in which epistemic constraints impact on moral theory. The question of whether you can have moral or practical reasons for belief, and how moral or practical and epistemic reason interact is also a theme that emerges in Paul Faulkner’s work, which has focused on the knowledge we acquire from testimony and the role of trust in this process. Paul has a book on this Knowledge on Trust, which had a special journal symposium dedicated to discussing it. This focus has led Faulkner to write extensively on social epistemology. What is the place of friendship in epistemology? Can we communicate moral knowledge, aesthetic knowledge and our knowledge of what our experiences are like? What should we say about the more collective dimensions of knowledge, such as collaborative science? How should we respond to disagreement? What should we make of other ways of thinking that seem alien or plain wrong? Is there any epistemic rationality to conversion?

One response here is to think that any confidence must be based on epistemic virtues, where virtue epistemology is something that figures prominently in Ryan Byerly’s work, given his interest in the intellectual virtues and their social cultivation. Ryan is currently writing a book Intellectual Dependability: A Virtue Theory of the Epistemic and Educational Ideal. Related to disagreement, Rosanna Keefe has written on what is involved in the suspension of belief. Her approach to this takes a more formal direction and involves an investigation to degrees of belief and the vagueness that infect belief.

This avenue connects with Dominic Gregory’s interest in modal epistemology or the study of our knowledge of the necessary and possible. He is also interested in the role our imagination can play in grounding this knowledge. The sceptical undercurrent in epistemology is then represented in the work of Bob Stern whose book Transcendental Arguments and Scepticism discusses the efficacy of transcendental arguments in responding to scepticism and sceptical doubt.

https://www.sheffield.ac.uk/philosophy/research/themes/epistemology

Epistemology is the study of knowledge and those things closely related to it: justification, what it takes for you to be justified, the relation between knowledge and justification, whether you can have any justified beliefs at all, and if so, how you come to know (or justifiably believe) things, how you can use what you know (or justifiably believe) to come to know (or justifiably believe) other things, and
the value of knowledge. The literature on epistemology is vast.

Here's a very brief summary of some epistemological discussions.

Concerning knowledge, many epistemologists think knowledge is justified true belief, where the justification you have is linked to the truth of the matter in the right kind of way, though what this way is a matter of debate; some epistemologists think knowledge can't be analyzed this way.

Concerning justification's relation to knowledge, some epistemologists think we don't need to be justified to know, and some think we do need to be.

Concerning what it takes to be justified, some epistemologists think that what it takes for you to be justified are only factors internal to the believer (Internalists). Others think it takes an external factor, like reliable or well-functioning cognitive faculties (Externalists).

Concerning justification, epistemologists differ on whether in any case you there is only one doxastic attitude you are justified in adopting toward a proposition, or whether in some cases more than one doxastic attitude is permissible (as Permissivists maintain). Closely related to the question of “permissivism,” is the question of peer disagreement. Some epistemologists argue that in the face of peer disagreement, one is justified in sticking to one’s guns (as the Steadfast View maintains); others argue that one ought to be conciliatory, moving in the direction of the peer with whom one disagrees (as Conciliationists maintain). Skeptics argue that we can't have any justified beliefs at all, and many epistemologists reply to the skeptic's arguments.

Concerning how we use what we know (justifiably believe) to come to know (justifiably believe) other things, some epistemologists (Foundationalists) argue that there are bedrock propositions that we know (justifiably believe), and we build our knowledge (justified beliefs) on those. Foundationalists often take perception, introspection and rational intuition as sources of foundational knowledge, in contrast to testimony (the role of memory being a matter of persistent dispute). Other epistemologists (Coherentists) argue that there aren't bedrock propositions; rather, a set of beliefs is justified as a whole, and several beliefs can be mutually supporting.

Concerning the value of knowledge, some argue that knowledge is intrinsically valuable. Others have argued that knowledge is valuable because of the role it plays in practical reasoning, and others argue that knowledge isn't more valuable than justified and true belief, but there are other epistemic states such as understanding, that do have value above their proper subparts. If knowledge is valuable, then treating genuine knowers as if they did not know or depriving people of knowledge, for instance because they belong to an outgroup, can be a form of epistemic injustice

https://philpapers.org/browse/epistemology

Coherence Theory

"An empirical belief is realatively true if and only if it coheres with a system of other beliefs, which together form a comprehensive account of reality."

Stephen J. Gould, the Harvard Paleontologist, offers this definition: In science, "fact" can only mean "confirmed to such a degree that it would be perverse to withhold provisional assent."

Succesfully Competitive Inductive Cogency:

Depends upon the evidential and conceptual ("context") of reasoning. An inductive argument from evidence to hypothesis is inductively cogent if and only if the hypothesis is that hypothesis which, of all the competing hypothesis, has the greatest probability of being true on the basis of the evidence. Thus, whether it is reasonable to accept a hypothesis as true, if the statements of evidence are true, is determined by whether that hypothesis is the most probable, on the evidence, of all those with which it competes.

Philosophical Problems and Arguments : An Introduction
by James W. Cornman, Keith Lehrer, George Sotiros Pappas

http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0872201244/104-9938841-0500749

Verificationism - Wikipedia
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Verificationism

BonJour's Basic Antifoundationalist Argument

Epistemologists find a number of problems with finding an meta-justification standard for justifying emperical beliefs.

Suppose, that there are basic empirical beliefs, that is, emperical beliefs (a) which are epistemically justified, and (b) whose justification does not depend on that of any further
emperical beliefs.
For a belief to be episemically justified requires that there be a reason why it is likely to be true.
A belief is justified for a person only if he is in cognitive possession of such a reason.
A person is in cognitive possession of such a reason only if he believes with justification the premises from which it follows that the belief is likely to be true.
The premises of such a justifying argument must include at least one empirical premise.
So, the justification of a supposed basic empirical belief depends on the justification of at least one other empirical belief, contradicting 1.
So, there can be no basic empirical beliefs including completely justified sceptical beliefs.

The 7 propositions seem to eliminate the possibility of emperical justification of any and all emperical beliefs. But it can lead to this untruthfullness of human beliefs in three ways which deal with the apparent "regress" of one belief depending upon another which depends upon another and so on:

If the regress of emperical justification does not terminate in basic emperical beliefs, then it must either:

Terminate in unjustified beleifs
Go on infinitely (without circularity)
Circle back upon itself in some way.

If we think about justification moving in a linear direction, with one proposition becomeing the justification for another we run into an viscious regress that doesnt seem to end. It can be open ended and go on forever or it can become circular where each support depending on the last leads to the same supports over time. This is how scepticism defeated foundationalism. It seems that all we were left with a hope for escape from this dilemma of no certain knowledge is a modified version of the circular argument. Instead of a linear regress of justifiactions we seek a nonlinear context of groups of evidences or propositions emerging more evidence than other means of gaining supports from evidences and propositions. Though we close the circle, different circlular arguments, corespond to, predict, and manilulate, events in the world, than other such arguments. If we have a competition amoungst such partial certainties, we gain at least the best knowledge we can find.

http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/TKno/TKnoHowa.htm

Foundherentism - Susan Haack

In principle, foundationalism holds that basic beliefs unilaterally support derived beliefs, with support always directed from the former to the latter; coherentism holds that beliefs mutually support each other when they belong to the same coherent belief-set. As these theories were refined, however, some foundationalists began to admit that even basic beliefs could be fallible, and that derived beliefs could mutually support each other; whereas some coherentists began to admit that experiential beliefs should be weighted so as to reflect realistic degrees of coherence or justification. So the rival theories began to lean closer together. Moreover, those foundationalists who wondered why there couldn't be mutual support between basic and derived beliefs were in danger of falling into coherentism. Those coherentists who wondered why experiential beliefs should be weighted more heavily than others were also falling into foundationalism.

Haack argues that foundationalism and coherentism don't exhaust the field, and that an intermediate theory is more plausible than either. It is possible to include the relevance of experience for the justification of empirical beliefs, as experientialist foundationalism does but coherentism does not, and at the same time, instead of requiring a privileged class of basic beliefs, to allow for pervasive mutual dependence among beliefs, as coherentism does but foundationalism does not. These are the key ideas of foundherentism. Precursors to Haack's view include Bertrand Russell's epistemology, in which both empirical foundations and coherence are components of justification.

Foundherentism - Haack introduces the analogy of the crossword puzzle to serve as a way of understanding how there can be mutual support among beliefs (as there is mutual support among crossword entries) without vicious circularity. The analogy between the structure of evidence and the crossword puzzle helps with another problem too. The clues to a crossword are the analogue of a person's experiential evidence, and the already-completed intersecting entries are the analogue of their reasons for a belief. She claims that her metaphor has proven particularly fruitful in her own work, and has been found useful by many readers, not only philosophers but also scientists, economists, legal scholars, etc.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foundherentism

Susan Haack is the most famous defender of a compromise between coherentism and foundationalism.

Her foundherentism likens justified belief systems to crossword puzzles.

In solving a crossword puzzle, your justification for accepting a given answer to one entry (say, 1-down) will be enhanced by its fit with your other answers for intersecting entries (say, 2-across). This is an example of the coherentist’s idea of mutual support in action. But you cannot solve the puzzle without relying on the clues external to the network of entries (you can’t just write in any set of words that fit the grid!). This is an example of the foundationalist’s idea of given evidence in action.

Haack thinks that an adequate account of the structure of justification must take advantage of both of these ideas from coherentism and foundationalism.

https://www.southampton.ac.uk/philosophy/undergraduate/decision-trees/...

Knowing How vs Knowing That

There is an important distinction between "knowing that" (know a concept), "knowing how" (understand an operation), and "acquaintance-knowledge" (know by relation).

Bertrand Russell stressed the distinction between "knowledge by description" and "knowledge by acquaintance".

Gilbert Ryle is also credited with stressing the distinction between knowing how and knowing that in The Concept of Mind.

In Personal Knowledge, Michael Polanyi argues for the epistemological relevance of knowledge how and knowledge that; using the example of the act of balance involved in riding a bicycle, he suggests that the theoretical knowledge of the physics involved in maintaining a state of balance cannot substitute for the practical knowledge of how to ride, and that it is important to understand how both are established and grounded.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epistemology

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Epistemology

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