Naturalized Epistemology - A theory about cognition in biological evolution - "Evolutionary epistemology" can refer to a
- branch of epistemology that applies the concepts of biological evolution to the growth of animal and human cognition
It argues that;
- the mind is in part genetically determined and that its structure and function reflect adaptation, a nonteleological process of interaction between the organism and its environment.
A cognitive trait tending to increase inclusive fitness in a given population should therefore grow more common over time, and a trait tending to prevent its carriers from passing on their genes should show up less and less frequently.
- attempts to pursue the traditional project of finding the meanings and truths of science philosophically have failed on their own terms and failed to offer any advantage over the more direct methods of psychology.
Scientific study of knowledge differs from philosophic study by
- focusing on how humans acquire knowledge rather than speculative analysis of knowledge
Replacement Naturalism maintains that;
- traditional epistemology should be abandoned and replaced with the methodologies of the natural sciences
The general thesis of "cooperative naturalism" is that
- traditional epistemology can benefit in its inquiry by using the knowledge we have gained from the cognitive sciences.
Evolutionary epistemology refers to three distinct topics:
(1) The biological evolution of cognitive mechanisms in animals and humans,
(2) A theory that knowledge itself evolves by natural selection
(3) The study of the historical discovery of new abstract entities such as abstract number or abstract value that necessarily precede the individual acquisition and usage of such abstractions.
Naturalized_epistemology
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naturalized_epistemology
Epistemology_naturalized
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology-naturalized/
Evolutionary_epistemology
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evolutionary_epistemology
General_philosophy
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epistemology
The source of much of the recent interest in Naturalized Epistemology is W.V.O Quine's celebrated essay, “Epistemology Naturalized” (Quine, 1969). Quine begins this essay by saying that “Epistemology is concerned with the foundations of science.” In an effort to show that science has an adequate foundation, epistemologists attempted to derive statements about the world around us from statements about our own sensations. Given that we are certain about our own sensations, if we could strictly derive our beliefs about the world from our beliefs about sensations, we could then be certain of the derived truths about the world as well. We would then have a firm foundation for both everyday knowledge and scientific knowledge. Quine argues that such efforts to ground our beliefs about the world have failed. The proposed derivations just don't work. Virtually all contemporary philosophers agree. Quine concludes that the traditional effort to respond to skepticism is a failure and recommends what on the surface seems to be the abandonment of epistemology altogether. He apparently thinks that the failure of this sort of foundationalism shows that epistemology is impossible. He writes:
The stimulation of his sensory receptors is all the evidence anybody has had to go on, ultimately, in arriving at his picture of the world. Why not just see how this construction really proceeds? Why not settle for psychology? (Quine, 1969: 75)
Quine seems to be recommending that we abandon the effort to show that we do in fact have knowledge and that we instead study the ways in which we form beliefs.
His proposal is that we study the psychological processes that take us from sensory stimulations to beliefs about the world. He elaborates on this idea in a widely quoted passage:
Epistemology, or something like it, simply falls into place as a chapter of psychology and hence of natural science.
It studies a natural phenomenon, viz., a physical human subject. This human subject is accorded a certain experimentally controlled input — certain patterns of irradiation in assorted frequencies, for instance — and in the fullness of time the subject delivers as output a description of the three-dimensional external world and its history. The relation between the meager input and the torrential output is a relation that we are prompted to study for somewhat the same reasons that always prompted epistemology: namely, in order to see how evidence relates to theory, and in what ways one's theory of nature transcends any available evidence...But a conspicuous difference between old epistemology and the epistemological enterprise in this new psychological setting is that we can now make free use of empirical psychology. (Quine, 1969: 82–3)
As Jaegwon Kim points out in a widely cited critical discussion of Quine, another conspicuous difference between traditional epistemology and what Quine recommends is that they study strikingly different topics (Kim, 1988: 390). The old epistemology was interested in questions about rationality, justification, and knowledge. The central questions concerned whether an epistemic support relation--a justifying relation--holds between our basic evidence and our beliefs about the world. Analysis of some of the arguments for skepticism reveals that they rely on the view that our evidence supports our beliefs only if our beliefs are deducible from that evidence. Seeing that they are not, many epistemologists are drawn to investigate other accounts of the epistemic support relation, accounts that allow for the possibility that our beliefs about the world are well supported by our sensory evidence, even if they are not strictly derivable from that evidence. As Kim sees it, Quine has proposed ignoring these questions about epistemic support and investigating instead the causal connections between our sensory evidence and our beliefs about the world. Thus, if we follow the Quinean recommendation, we will study the same relata--our basic evidence and our beliefs about the world. However, we will study a different relation. In the original case, we looked to see if there was an epistemic support relation between the data and the beliefs. In the new case, we look to see the nature of the causal connection between them.
The Quinean view that we should abandon epistemology for psychology is not widely accepted by contemporary naturalists in epistemology. (See Almeder, 1998; BonJour, 1994; Foley, 1994; Fumerton, 1994.) Even Quine's later views were more moderate (Quine, 1990). Perhaps this is because questions about the quality of our reasons for our beliefs about the world strike even naturalists as perfectly good questions, questions deserving of investigation and analysis. Perhaps it is because new views about the nature of knowledge and justification hold that they require the use of processes and methods that reliably lead to truth rather than recognizably good reasons. Whether we actually use such processes and methods seems to be a perfectly good question. In any case, Quinean Replacement Naturalism finds relatively few supporters.
One recent author who does defend a view close to Quine's is Hilary Kornblith. Kornblith contends that once traditional epistemologists admit that the Cartesian program of deriving beliefs about the world from certain foundations fails, they end up endorsing as legitimate whatever principles enable them to ratify the beliefs they started with. He writes,
Of course knowledge is possible if we weaken the standards for knowledge far enough, in particular if we weaken them until we can show that many of our beliefs then pass the standards. But this seems to be nothing more than an exercise in self-congratulation. Why should we care about knowledge so defined? (Kornblith, 1999: 160)
He goes on to say,
But if our standards for knowledge are merely designed to allow us to attach the epithet ‘knowledge’ to whatever it is we pretheoretically believe, then ... the result is an uncritical endorsement of the epistemological status quo. (Kornblith, 1999: 160)
Somewhat similar sentiments, though perhaps for different reasons, can be found in the writings of Stephen Stich. (Stich, 1990)
There is, however, a difference between the view that our pretheoretical beliefs are justified (or amount to knowledge), no matter what else is true of them, and the search for plausible general principles about knowledge and justification that have the result that those beliefs are justified. The principles philosophers put forward, including inference to the best explanation, principles about coherence and the conservation of belief, and so on, can be assessed and criticized. Few armchair epistemologists say that “whatever it is we pretheoretically believe” amounts to knowledge. Virtually all epistemologists agree that many everyday beliefs fall short of what's needed for justification and knowledge. Some conclude that knowledge is less common than one would initially think. By reflecting carefully on what they take to be realistic examples, they attempt to identify what is good about possible ways of reasoning. By calling our attention to the reasoning that withstands scrutiny and reflection, they can contribute to an effort to help us improve. So many defenders of traditional epistemology would deny that they are simply endorsing the status quo. (See Feldman, 1999)
3. Cooperative Naturalism
Although Quine's Replacement Naturalism is not widely accepted, a more modest descendant of his view is extremely popular. This view, Cooperative Naturalism, holds that, while there are evaluative questions to pursue, empirical results from psychology concerning how we actually think and reason are essential or useful for making progress in addressing evaluative questions. A representative claim of this sort can be found in Susan Haack's Evidence and Inquiry, “ ... the results from the sciences of cognition may be relevant to, and may be legitimately used in the resolution of traditional epistemological problems” (Haack, 1993: 118). Many philosophers who are more favorably disposed to naturalism than Haack is have voiced similar sentiments. (For example, Goldman, 1992; Stich and Nisbett, 1980: 118; Harman, 1986: 7; Kornblith, 1994: 7.)
What role empirical results can play in epistemology depends in large part on what counts as epistemology. Philip Kitcher's 1992 article, “The Naturalists Return,” is a long and comprehensive study of naturalism in epistemology, arguing in part that the apsychologistic tendencies of the 20th century are in fact departures from what was standard in philosophy. Kitcher asks, “How could our psychological and biological capacities and limitations fail to be relevant to the study of human knowledge?” (Kitcher, 1992: 58) Obviously, empirical work is relevant to “the study of human knowledge.” But this shows its relevance to epistemology only if epistemology is itself as broad as the study of human knowledge. If, however, there are specifically philosophical questions about knowledge, and epistemology is the study of those questions, then the relevance of empirical work about such things as our psychological and biological capacities remains open for debate. Disputes about which questions count as philosophical are likely to be futile. However, it is possible to examine fruitfully the merits of Cooperative Naturalism with respect to some of the issues typically addressed by epistemologists.
In thinking about the role of empirical information in epistemology it is helpful to keep in mind the fact that there are at least three possible views about the potential sources of information for epistemological theorizing, rather than the two that are sometimes identified. Some philosophers seem to be a priorists, in that they think that only what can be known a priori is relevant to epistemological questions. Other philosophers are armchair epistemologists, since they are willing to rely on common sense empirical knowledge — what can be known from one's armchair, as well as a priori information. And scientific epistemologists proclaim the value of (or need for) the results from empirical studies for epistemology. This three way classification complicates the discussion of Cooperative Naturalism. If Cooperative Naturalism is the view that empirical information is important for resolving epistemological issues, then armchair epistemologists can accept it. However, if Cooperative Naturalism is the view that detailed information from the empirical sciences is important for epistemology, then armchair epistemologists are likely not to agree. There is no point in arguing about what Cooperative Naturalism “really” is. It will be enough to notice these different possibilities.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology-naturalized/#2
In a very influential article, Quine suggests that traditional investigations into epistemology are hopeless. They should be replaced by what he called "Naturalized Epistemology."
Why should epistemology be "naturalized"?
Quine begins by recalling how the traditional epistemological foundationalist project has failed: He has Descartes & Hume in mind.
(i) the Cartesian quest for certainty fails - we cannot get from reasoning to certain foundations for knowledge of the world
(ii) Hume's problem of induction shows that no knowledge about the world can be logically deduced from observations we make about the world
So what's an epistemologist to do?
Quine's Suggestion: Give up traditional epistemology.
On the traditional approach epistemology precedes science. (Again, think of Descartes.) Epistemology establishes what is justified as knowledge, and since Descartes, that has meant primarily establishing at least that the conclusions of science count as empirical knowledge. Traditional epistemology is normative: it recommends particular methodologies for doing science
Instead, Quine proposes an image of epistemology within science:
"Epistemology in its new setting ... is contained in natural science, as a chapter of psychology." (260)
What does this mean?
We should give up the normative aspect of epistemology.
Forget how we ought to form beliefs (e.g., forget justification), focus on how we do form beliefs.
"The stimulation of his sensory receptors is all the evidence anybody has had to go on, ultimately, in arriving at his picture of the world. Why not just see how this construction really proceeds? Why not settle for psychology?" (256)
Reactions to Quine's Proposal
While some have bought wholeheartedly into Quine's suggestion, others have not. (Some even doubt this is his suggestion.)
(1) Defending normative epistemology
Some argue we can carry on doing traditional epistemology as long as we give up Cartesian aspirations to certainty.
This attitude is often combined with response #2.
(2) Paying greater attention to what science tells us
That is, avoid 'armchair epistemology'. Check your epistemological theories against scientific evidence.
Much work in reliabilism is influenced by this idea. The "reliabilist" view holds that justification is a consequence of establishing one's beliefs on the basis of methodologies which have proved reliable. Since the reliability of any proposed method for deciding what is rational to believe is itself an empirical question, such questions are to be settled by scientific methods which have thus far proved reliable.
(3) Bringing philosophy to bear on scientific problems
E.g., Cognitive science. Philosophical work on consciousness.
(4) Reconceiving Epistemology as 'the Science Police'
(i) "a verb-sense of epistemology, ... drawing ongoing critical attention to particular kinds of motivating concerns, questions, and methods" (286)
(ii) historical epistemology - studying where particular (scientific) concepts came from (studying 'social construction')
Quine's Argument for Naturalized Epistemology
http://people.loyno.edu/~folse/NaturalizedEpistemology.html
No comments:
Post a Comment