- If a belief is justified, then it is either a basic justified belief or an inferentially justified belief.
- There are no basic justified beliefs.
Therefore,
- If a belief is justified, then it is justified in virtue of belonging to an inferential chain.
- All inferential chains are such that either (a) they contain an infinite number of beliefs; or (b) they contain circles; or (c) they contain beliefs that are not justified.
- No belief is justified in virtue of belonging to an infinite inferential chain.
- No belief is justified in virtue of belonging to a circular inferential chain.
- No belief is justified in virtue of belonging to an inferential chain that contains unjustified beliefs.
Therefore,
- There are no justified beliefs.
Premise 1 is beyond reproach, given our previous definitions. Premise 2 is justified by the mode of hypothesis. Step 3 of the argument follows from premises 1 and 2. Premise 4 is also beyond reproach—the only remaining possible structure for an inferential chain to have is to contain basic justified beliefs, but there are none of those according to premise 2. Premise 5 is justified by appeal to the mode of infinite regression, and premise 6 is justified by appeal to the mode of circularity. Premise 7 might seem to be a truism, but we will have to take a closer look at it.
It is interesting to note that Agrippa’s trilemma is perfectly general; in particular, it applies to philosophical positions as well as to ordinary propositions. In fact, when Agrippa’s trilemma is applied to epistemological theories themselves, the result is what has been called “the problem of the criterion” (see Chisholm 1973).
Many contemporary epistemological positions can be stated as a reaction to Agrippa’s trilemma. In fact, all of premises 2, 5, 6 and 7 have been rejected by different philosophers at one time or another. We examine those responses in what follows.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/skepticism/#PyrrSkep
Epistemologists find a number of problems with finding an meta-justification standard for justifying emperical beliefs;
-
Suppose, that there are basic empirical beliefs, that is, emperical
beliefs (a) which are epistemically justified, and (b) whose
justification does not depend on that of any further emperical
beliefs.
-
For a belief to be epistemically justified requires that there be a
reason why it is likely to be true.
-
A belief is justified for a person only if he is in cognitive
possession of such a reason.
-
A person is in cognitive possession of such a reason only if he
believes with justification the premises from which it follows that
the belief is likely to be true.
-
The premises of such a justifying argument must include at least one
empirical premise.
-
So, the justification of a supposed basic empirical belief depends on
the justification of at least one other empirical belief,
contradicting 1.
-
So, there can be no basic empirical beliefs including completely
justified sceptical beliefs.
The 7 propositions seem to eliminate the possibility of emperical justification of any and all emperical beliefs. But it can lead to this untruthfullness of human beliefs in three ways which deal with the apparent "regress" of one belief depending upon another which depends upon another and so on:
If the regress of emperical justification does not terminate in basic emperical beliefs, then it must either:
(1) - Terminate in Unjustified Beliefs
(2) - Go on Infinitely (without circularity)
(3) - Circle Back Upon Itself in some way.
If we think about justification moving in a linear direction, with one proposition becomeing the justification for another we run into an viscious regress that doesnt seem to end. It can be open ended and go on forever or it can become circular where each support depending on the last leads to the same supports over time. This is how scepticism defeated foundationalism. It seems that all we were left with a hope for escape from this dilemma of no certain knowledge is a modified version of the circular argument. Instead of a linear regress of justifiactions we seek a nonlinear context of groups of evidences or propositions emerging more evidence than other means of gaining supports from evidences and propositions. Though we close the circle, different circlular arguments, corespond to, predict, and manilulate, events in the world, than other such arguments. If we have a competition amoungst such partial certainties, we gain at least the best knowledge we can find.
http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/TKno/TKnoHowa.htm
Sceptics often found ready allies in the two dogmatist camps; all sides use skepticism.
..empiricism and rationalism were often regarded as opposing views. The sceptics liked neither, and as we will see, argued against both the appeal to sense-experience and the appeal to reason. And the sceptics often found ready allies in the two dogmatist camps.
- Empiricists joined sceptics in denying the power of pure reason to give us certainty.
- Rationalists joined sceptics in denying the power of sense-experience to give us certainty.
The battles become as confusing as any three-cornered fight. Descartes, a chief defender of the rationalist view, plays the sceptic when discussing what sense-experience can achieve. Mill, a chief defender of empiricism, plays the sceptic when discussing what reason can achieve...
Common Sense, Science & Scepticism: A Historical Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge by Alan Musgrave
Is Scepticism Practical?
There is another very old objection to scepticism, which holds that
no matter what she says the sceptic cannotherself take her philosophy seriouslyand live by it.
For consider what this would mean.
The sceptic claims that we cannot know for sure that the next piece of bread we eat will nourish us while the plate on which the bread lies would not nourish us. So the consistent sceptic, offered sandwiches on plates, ought to bite into the plates as often as she bites into the sandwiches.
Similarly, the sceptic wishing to descend from a tall building claims that we cannot know for sure that taking the lift will be safe while chucking herself out of the window will be unhealthy. So we ought to find sceptics regularly throwing themselves out of windows in order to get to the ground!...
Common Sense, Science and Scepticism: A Historical Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge by Alan Musgrave
https://www.amazon.com/Common-Sense-Science-Scepticism-Introduction/dp/0521436257
David Hume qualified his own Scepticism by pointing out that to live at all we have perpetually to make choices, decisions, and this forces us to form judgements about the way things are, whether we like it or not. Since certainty is not available to us we have to make the best assessments we can of the realities we face - and this is incompatible with regarding all alternatives with equal scepticism. Our Scepticism therefore needs to be, as he put it, mitigated. It is indeed doubtful whether anyone could live on the basis of complete Scepticism - or, if they could, whether such a life would be worth living. But this refutation of Scepticism, if refutation it is, is not a logical argument.
In practical life we must steer a middle course between demanding a degree of certainty that we can never have and treating all possibilities as if they were of equal weight when they are not.
Story of Philosophy by Bryan Magee
http://www.amazon.com/Story-Philosophy-Bryan-Magee/dp/078947994X
...One of the most consistent sceptics seems to have been Pyrrho. Bertrand Russell tells a nice story about him:
Pyrrho... maintained that we never know enough to be sure that one course of action is wiser than another. In his youth, when he was taking his constitutional one afternoon, he saw Anaxarchus, his teacher in philosophy (from whom he had imbibed his principles) with his head stuck in a ditch, unable to get out. After contemplating him for some time, he walked on, maintaining that there was no sufficient ground for thinking he would do any good by pulling the old man out. Others, less sceptical, affected a rescue, and blamed Pyrrho for his heartlessness. But his teacher, true to his principles, praised him for his consistency. (1935: 11-12. The source of the story is Diogenes Laertius 1853: 403)
Pyrrho is said to have lived an extraordinary life, in which he paid little heed to his comfort or safety. He is also said to have lived to a ripe old age! The secret of his success lay with his disciples, who followed him around and saved him from himself, making sure he ate properly, dressed warmly, did not walk over cliffs, and so forth. (My favourite story about Pyrrho is that the government so admired him that they decided to exempt all philosophers from taxation!)
These stories merely reinforce the objection that one could not adhere consistently to sceptical principles and live very long. But the Greek sceptics justified the actions of Pyrrho's disciples in the following way. Every day all of us must make countless decisions to act in one way rather than another. In each society there will be certain customary ways to behave: it is the custom in our society to eat the sandwich rather than the plate on which it is offered, to take the lift to get down to the ground rather than throw yourself out of the window and so forth. Now there is nothing to stop the sceptic, since she has to behave somehow, from behaving in the customary ways. And this is what, in fact, the sceptics do. The difference between the dogmatist and sceptic lies not in the way that they behave, but in whether they think the customary ways of behaving can be shown to be correct. The dogmatist claims to know that the sandwich will nourish him while the plate will not. The sceptic eats the sandwich, too, but with no such pretension to knowledge. One of Pyrrho's followers writes:
We live in accordance with the normal rules of life, undogmatically, seeing that we cannot remain wholly inactive. And it would seem that this regulation of life is fourfold, and that one part of it lies in the guidance of Nature, another in the constraint of the passions, another in the tradition of laws and customs, another in the instruction of the arts. Nature's guidance is that by which we are naturally capable of sensation and thought; constraint of the passions is that whereby hunger drives us to food and thirst to drink; tradition of customs and laws, that whereby we regard piety in the conduct of life as good, but impiety as evil; instruction of the arts, that whereby we are not inactive in such arts as we adopt. But we make all these statements undogmatically. (Sextus Empiricus 1933-49, I : 23~4)
Is this response adequate? If the sceptic is to behave in the customary ways, to do in Rome as the Romans do, as we say, then she has to know what the Romans do, what are the customary ways of behaving. But the true sceptic cannot claim to know this either. Quite so. The sceptic will reply, however, that just as she eats the sandwich without claiming to know that it will nourish her, so also she eats the sandwich without claiming to know that this is the done thing.
Common Sense, Science and Scepticism: A Historical Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge by Alan Musgrave
https://www.amazon.com/Common-Sense-Science-Scepticism-Introduction/dp/0521436257
All sorts of philosophers from Aristotle to David Hume have argued that too much scepticism makes life impossible. In 1748 Hume wrote that;
a Pyrrhonian… must acknowledge, if he will acknowledge anything, that all human life must perish, were his principles universally and steadily to prevail. All discourse, all action would immediately cease; and men remain in total lethargy, till the necessities of nature, unsatisfied, put an end to their miserable existence.
Hume thought that a consistent Pyrrhonian Sceptic would not eat, drink or keep himself out of danger, because he would be incapable of deciding how to do any of these things. Should he put bread in his mouth or should he nibble a stone? Ordinary people believe that it is bread which is nourishing, but a Sceptic is surely committed to keeping an open mind about it. Should he step aside from a thundering horse, or under its hooves? A Sceptic would have to suspend judgement on all such matters and suffer the consequences. One ancient author made a similar point by asking: ‘how is it that someone who suspends judgement does not rush away to a mountain instead of to the bath, or stands up and walks to the door rather than the wall when he wants to go out to the market-place?’
Arcesilaus and other like-minded philosophers had an answer to this. A bath does seem to be the sort of place where you could get a good wash, and this explains why a Sceptic will head towards one when he wants to get clean. If a mountain seemed to be such a place, then he would go there instead; but it does not, so he goes to the bath. A door does seem to be the best way out of a house, bread does seem to be nourishing, and being trampled by horses does not seem to be a good idea. According to Arcesilaus, even though a Sceptic will refuse to form an opinion about how things really are, he can still freely admit that they appear one way rather than another. As Timon once said: ‘That honey is sweet I do not affirm, but I agree that it appears so.’ Being human, a Sceptic is affected by appearances just like everyone else and so he will behave much like everyone else, at least in the essentials of life. He follows instincts, observes customs and generally acts in a sensible way, but he does so by habit or as a matter of human nature, not because he endorses any opinions about the world. As Sextus later put it, a Sceptic follows ‘laws and customs and natural feelings’ but lives ‘without holding opinions’. Thus if you were to ask him whether he definitely believes that bread is nourishing, a Sceptic would indeed say no, because he suspends judgement on the matter. But you will still find him in the larder...
Dream of Reason: A History of Philosophy from the Greeks to the Renaissance: Gottlieb, Anthony, McCaddon, Wanda:
https://www.amazon.com/Dream-Reason-History-Philosophy-Renaissance/dp/0786190566
a. Traditional Foundationalism
Traditionally the foundations of knowledge have been seen as infallible (they cannot be wrong), incorrigible (they cannot be refuted), and indubitable (they cannot be doubted).
For empiricists, these foundations
consist in your beliefs about
your own experience.
Your beliefs are basic
and non-basic.
Your basic beliefs comprise such beliefs as that you are now seeing a red shape in your visual field, let us say, and that you are aware of a pungent smell. In order to justify your non-basic belief that Thierry Henry is the best striker in Europe, you must be able to infer it from other beliefs, say that he has scored the most goals. The traditional foundationalist claim, however, is that this sort of inferential justification is not required for your basic beliefs.
There may not actually be a
red object in the world because
you may be hallucinating, but,
nevertheless, you cannot be wrong
about the fact that you now believe
that you am seeing something red.
Justification for such beliefs is
provided by experiential states that
are not themselves beliefs, that is,
by your immediate apprehension of the
content of your sensory, perceptual
experience, or what is sometimes
termed, "the Given".
It is, then, your experience of seeing red that justifies your belief that you are seeing red. Such experience is non-conceptual. It is, though, the raw material which you then go on to have conceptual thoughts about. This conception of the relation between knowledge and experience has had a distinguished history. It was advocated by the British empiricists--Locke, Berkeley and Hume--and by the important modern adherents C. I. Lewis (1946) and R. Chisholm (1989). However, this conception of how your perceptual beliefs are justified has been widely attacked, and the next two sections address the most influential arguments against traditional foundationalism.
Sellars and the Myth of the Given
Sellars (1956) provides an extended critique of the notion of the Given. There are two parts to Sellars' argument: first, he claims that knowledge is part of the "logical space of reasons;" and second, he provides an alternative account of "looks talk," or an alternative reading of such claims as "that looks red to me," claims that traditionally have been seen as infallible and as foundations for our perceptual knowledge. According to Sellars, no cognitive states are non-inferentially justified. For him:
"The essential part is that in characterising an episode or a state as that of knowing, we are placing it in the logical space of reasons, of justifying and being able to justify what one says." (Sellars, 1956, p. 76)
Whether we are talking about perceptual or non-perceptual knowledge, we must be able to offer reasons for why we take such claims to be true. To even claim appropriately that I have knowledge that I now seem to be seeing a red shape, I must be able to articulate such reasons as, "since my eyes are working fine, and the light is good, I am right in thinking that I am having a certain sensory experience." As Rorty (1979, chapter 4) argues, justification is essentially a linguistic or "conversational" notion; it must consist in the reasoned recognition of why a particular belief is likely to be true or why one is rightly said to be having a certain experience. If such an account of justification is correct, then the notion of non-inferentially justified basic beliefs is untenable and non-conceptual perceptual experience cannot provide the justification for our perceptual beliefs.
Surely, though, "this looks red to me," cannot be something that I can be wrong about. Such a foundationalist claim seems to be undeniable. Sellars, however, suggests that such wording does not indicate infallibility. One does not say, "This looks red to me," to (infallibly) report the nature of one's experience; rather, one uses such a locution in order to flag that one is unsure whether one has correctly perceived the world.
... when I say "X looks green to me"...the fact that I make this report rather than the simple report "X is green," indicates that certain considerations have operated to raise, so to speak in a higher court, the question 'to endorse or not to endorse.' I may have reason to think that X may not after all be green. (Sellars, 1956, p. 41)
Thus, Sellars provides a two-pronged attack on traditional foundationalism. The way we describe our perceptual experience does indeed suggest that we have infallible access to certain private experiences, private experiences that we cannot be mistaken about. However, we should recognize the possibility that we may be being fooled by grammar here. Sellars gives an alternative interpretation of such statements as, "this looks red to me," an interpretation that does not commit one to having such a privileged epistemological access to one's perceptual experience. Further, a conceptual analysis of "knowledge" reveals that knowledge is essentially a rational state and, therefore, that one cannot claim to know what one has no reason for accepting as true. Such reasons must be conceived in terms of linguistic constructions that one can articulate, and thus, the bare presence of the Given cannot ground the knowledge we have of our own experience or, consequently, of the world. This, then, is a rejection of the traditional foundationalist picture, or what Sellars calls, "the Myth of the Given."
One of the forms taken by the Myth of the Given is the idea that there is, indeed must be, a structure of particular matter of such fact that (a) each fact can not only be noninferentially known to be the case, but presupposes no other knowledge either of particular matters of fact, or of general truths; and (b) such that the noninferential knowledge of facts belonging to this structure constitutes the ultimate court of appeal for all factual claims, particular and general, about the world. (Sellars, 1956, pp. 68-9)
http://www.iep.utm.edu/e/epis-per.htm
Seeing That,
- Seeing As &
- - Simple Seeing
Perception is the process by which we acquire information about the world around us using our five senses. Consider the nature of this information. Looking out of your window, you see that it is raining. Your perception represents the world as being like that. To perceive the world in this way, therefore, it is required that you possess concepts, that is, ways of representing and thinking about the world. In this case, you require the concept RAIN. Thus, seeing that your coffee cup is yellow and that the pencil is green involves the possession of the concepts COFFEE CUP, YELLOW, PENCIL and GREEN. Such perception is termed "perceiving that," and is factive; that is, it is presupposed that you perceive the world correctly. To perceive that it is raining, it must be true that it is raining. You can also, though, perceive the world to be a certain way and yet be mistaken. This we can call, "perceiving as," or in the usual case, "seeing as". A stick partly submerged in water may not be bent but, nevertheless, you see it as bent. Your perception represents the stick as being a certain way, although it turns out that you are wrong. Much of your perception, then, is representational: you take the world to be a certain way, sometimes correctly, when you see that the world is thus and so, and sometimes incorrectly, when the world is not how you perceive it to be.
It also seems that there is a form of perception that does not require the possession of concepts (although this claim has been questioned). It is plausible to claim that cognitively unsophisticated creatures, those that are not seen as engaging in conceptually structured thought, can perceive the world, and that at times we can perceptually engage with the world in a non-conceptual way. You can tell that the wasp senses or perceives your presence because of its irascible behavior. When you are walking along the High Street daydreaming, you see bus stops, waste bins, and your fellow pedestrians. You must see them because you do not bump into them, but you do not see that the bus stop is blue or that a certain pedestrian is wearing Wrangler jeans. You can, of course, come to see the street in this way if you focus on the scene in front of you, but the claim here is that there is a coherent form of perception that does not involve such conceptual structuring. Let us call such baseline perceptual engagement with the world, "simple seeing". This perception involves the acquisition of perceptual information about the world, information that enables us to visually discriminate objects and to successfully engage with them, but also information that does not amount to one having a conceptually structured representation of the world. (Dretske, 1969, refers to simple seeing as "non-epistemic" seeing, and refers to 'seeing that' as "epistemic" seeing).
You can, then, simply see the bus stop, or you can see that the bus stop is blue, or you can, mistakenly, see the bus stop as made of sapphire. These are all forms of perceptual experience, ways you have of causally engaging with the world using your sensory apparatus and ways that have a distinctive conscious or "phenomenological" dimension. Seeing in its various forms strikes your consciousness in a certain way, a way that you are now experiencing as you look at your computer screen. This article investigates the causal and epistemic roles of this perceptual experience.
A little more terminology: the term "sensation" can be used to refer to the conscious aspect of perception, but note that one can have such sensations even when one would not be said to be perceiving the world. When hallucinating, for example, one is having the sensations usually characteristic of perceptual experience, even though in such cases one's experience would not be described as perceptual.
Consider how these various kinds of perceptual experience are related to our perceptual beliefs. Perceptual beliefs are those concerning the perceptible features of our environment, and they are beliefs that are grounded in our perceptual experience of the world. The content of such beliefs can be acquired in other ways: You could be told that the bus stop is blue, or you could remember that it is blue. Right now, though, waiting for the bus, you acquire this belief by looking straight at it, and, thus, you have a perceptual belief concerning this particular fact. Just how your perceptual beliefs are grounded in your perceptual experience is a contentious issue. There is certainly a causal relation between the two, but some philosophers also claim that it is perceptual experience that provides justification for our perceptual beliefs. This foundationalist claim is denied by the coherentist (see sections 3 and 4 below).
http://www.iep.utm.edu/e/epis-per.htm
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