Universal Skepticism is Usually Stated in One of Two Ways
[1] - Positive Universal Skepticism:
In its positive form it consists
of the doctrine that man
can know nothing.
This belief can be easily dismissed, because anyone who defends it finds himself immersed in hopeless absurdities.
In asserting that there is no knowledge, the skeptic is asserting a knowledge claim—which according to his own theory is impossible.
The universal skeptic wishes to
claim truth for a theory that
denies man's ability to arrive
at truth, and this puts the
skeptic in the unenviable
position of uttering
nonsense.
...he cannot even begin to argue for his position, because the "possibility of knowledge is presupposed in the very possibility of argument, in the very possibility of having recourse to reasons." [8] As Francis Parker explains:
There is such a
thing as knowledge.
The assertion of this proposition is necessarily true if there is to be any assertion at all, for its contradictory is self-contradictory.
If the assertion
"There is no knowledge"
is true, then it is false
...for that assertion itself purports to be an instance of knowledge. Thus the only alternative to the recognition of the existence of knowledge is, as Aristotle said, a return to the vegetative state where no assertions whatever can be made.
[2] - Negative Universal Skepticism:
The second form of universal skepticism
consists of the doctrine that we must
doubt every alleged instance
of knowledge.
Through this negative formulation,
the universal skeptic seeks to avoid
the contradiction of asserting a
knowledge claim while denying
the existence of knowledge.
But the doctrine that we should doubt every knowledge claim translates_into the positive assertion that man can never attain certainty—and this version of skepticism fares no better than the preceding.
We must ask if this "principle of
universal doubt" is itself certain,
or is it open to doubt as well?
If it is known with certainty, at
least one thing is beyond doubt,
which makes the principle false.
If, however, the principle is
open to doubt—i.e., if it
is not certain—then on what
grounds can the skeptic claim
greater plausibility for his
theory than any other?
The logician C. N. Bittle elaborates on this problem:
Skeptics either have valid reasons for their universal doubting, or they have no valid reasons for it.
If they have valid reasons, they
surely know something that is
valid, and they no longer
are real skeptics.
If they have no valid reasons,
they have no reason to doubt.
In the first case their position is inconsistent, and in the second case their position is irrational. Whichever way they turn, their position is untenable.
Why, according to the universal skeptic, should every knowledge claim be doubted? "Because," he will reply, "man is capable of error, and it is possible in any given instance that he has committed an error." We must remember, however, that
"error" (or falsehood) is the
opposite of "truth"—and the
skeptic who appeals to error
implicitly admits that a
proposition cannot be true
and false, correct and
incorrect, at the same
time and in the same
respect.
Thus, whether he likes it or
not, the skeptic must surrender
to the logical principle known
as the Law of Contradiction (which
states that a proposition cannot
be true and false at the same
time and in the same respect).
...therefore, the skeptic must
concede the validity of the Law
of Contradiction and its corollaries:
the Law of Identity (A is A,
a thing is itself) and
the Law of the Excluded Middle
(something is either A or not-A).
...the main source of confusion in the skeptical approach: the equation of knowledge and certainty with infallibility.
When the skeptic claims that every knowledge claim should be doubted because man is capable of making mistakes, he is simply pointing out the obvious: that man is a fallible being.
No one, not even the most resolute
antiskeptic, will deny the point
that man is fallible. (We must
wonder, though, how the skeptic
arrived at this knowledge. Is
he certain that man is fallible?)
The skeptic fails to realize that it is precisely man's fallibility that generates the need for a science of knowledge. If man were infallible—if all knowledge were given to him without the slightest possibility of error—then the need for epistemological guidelines with which to verify ideas, with which to sort the true from the false, would not arise. Man requires a method to minimize the possibility of error, and this is the function of epistemology. A science of knowledge enables us to discriminate between justified and unjustified beliefs; and since the beliefs of an infallible being would not stand in need of verification, he could have no use for epistemological standards. Where infallibility is involved, concepts such as truth, falsity, certainty and uncertainty are stripped of any possible application.
Consider the basic argument of the skeptic. We have seen that fallibility gives rise to epistemological guidelines used to distinguish truth from falsity, certainty from uncertainty, and so forth. The skeptic, however, starts from the same premise—that man is fallible—and uses it to argue that man can never achieve truth and certainty. It is because man is capable of error that he must distinguish truth from falsehood, certainty from doubt. "But," argues the skeptic, "it is because man is capable of error that he can never attain truth and certainty."
The skeptic thus turns epistemology
on its head by using the foundation
for a science of knowledge—human
fallibility—as a weapon to argue,
in effect, that a science of
knowledge is impossible
to man.
Even if the universal skeptic could consistently adhere to his position (which he cannot), his victory would be an empty one. His claim that man cannot acquire knowledge and certainty reduces to the claim that man is fallible—and this tells us nothing new, except that the skeptic prefers to use epistemological terms while totally ignoring their context.
Since man is not infallible, any
concepts of "knowledge" or "certainty"
that require infallibility are, for
that very reason, inapplicable to man
and totally irrelevant to
human epistemology.
Even if the skeptical position made sense, it would fail to tell us anything concerning human knowledge and human certainty—which removes it from the realm of serious consideration.
In summary, we have indicted universal skepticism on two counts: first, because it cannot be maintained without contradiction and, second, because it commits what we shall hereafter refer to as
The Infallibilist Fallacy;
the equation of episte-mological
terms, such as "knowledge" and
"certainty," with a standard of
infallibility, which is completely
inappropriate to man and to the
science of knowledge in general.
Dialogue Between Skeptic & Anti-Skeptic
The following dialogue between a skeptic and an antiskeptic covers the primary arguments against the senses. Although the specific issues arc different from our previous discussions, it is instructive to note that the skeptical fallacies remain basically the same. The informal, conversational format of this dialogue will hopefully make for interesting and entertaining reading.
Skeptic: "You claim that man gains knowledge of reality through his senses, but' I submit that our sense are deceptive. Since we cannot rationally defend the reliability of sensory evidence, we must place trust in them as a matter of faith."
Antiskeptic: "Why do you say that?"
Skeptic: "Because our senses give us contradictory testimony, and even you stress that contradictions cannot exist. Look, I'll prove it to you by taking this pencil and placing it in ..."
Antiskeptic: "Excuse me for a moment. If I understand cor rectly, you are going to demonstrate that our senses do not give us accurate knowledge of reality. Is this correct?"
Skeptic: "Yes."
Antiskeptic: "Then you cannot start from the prior assumption that our senses do give us accurate knowledge of reality, because this would entail accepting the truth of the very proposition which you wish to disprove. Do you agree?"
Skeptic: "Of course."
Antiskeptic: "Then you won't mind if, from this point on, I don't grant you this assumption."
Skeptic: "Naturally. Now may I proceed with my demon stration?"
Antiskeptic: (staring in opposite directionno answer).
Skeptic: "I said, may I proceed?"
Antiskeptic: (startled). "Did I hear something?"
Skeptic: (irritated). "I'm talking to you."
Antiskeptic: "I beg your pardon."
Skeptic: "Are you going to be serious or not? Here I am trying to carry on an intelligent philosophical conversation, and you're acting silly."
Antiskeptic: (squinting his eyes). "It looks and sounds like you are talking to me, but then I can't be certain, since I never trust what I see and hear. In fact, I can't be sure that you are actually sitting there."
Skeptic: "I insist that you behave reasonably!"
Antiskeptic: "If I could only trust what I see and hear, I might be able to reply assuming of course that I could trust you, if you're really there, to hear what I actually say. But, then, I couldn't be sure that what I hear myself saying is what I've said, because ..."
Skeptic: "All right, you've made your point. Have it your way. Assume, for the sake of argument, that we are communicating accurately. I admit that it cannot be proven, but assume it for now."
Antiskeptic: "Why?"
Skeptic: "So I can make my point."
Antiskeptic: "I must assume, in other words, that my senses are not deceptiveat least as they pertain to this conversationso that you can get your argument off the ground to 'prove' that this entire assumption is unfounded. If your argument is correct, you don't have the means with which to make your point. Through your attempt at communication and argument, you are admitting the validity of sense perceptionand, there fore, by arguing that sense perception is deceptive, you cut the ground from under your own feet and become mired in a hopeless absurdity."
Skeptic: "I'll restate my argument somewhat. I don't deny that, for practical purposes, we act on the assumption that our senses enable us to perceive without deception. Language, as you have pointed out, depends on this assumption. What I wish to argue is that our naive trust in our senses is without logical foundations. Although we may have faith in our senses from day to day, they are not as reliable as the average person thinksand 1 can demonstrate this by showing you an example where our senses are unreliable, because they give us contradictory infor mation. If this is true, then we have no way of ascertaining when we are being deceived and when we are not."
Antiskeptic: "Your argument hasn't changed any; you have merely elaborated it. Like all skeptics, you seem to think that you can assume as true the very thing you are trying to disprove, and you attempt to skirt this problem by stipulating that you are doing so for practical purposes because we make these assumptions in everyday life. You claim that, as a philosopher, you have discovered reasons to doubt the validity of sense perception. My point is this: regardless of whether you call your use of language 'practical' or whatever, by attempting to communicate you commit yourself to a certain philosophic contextnamely, the context that makes communication possible. Once you are working within this context, it is completely irrational to turn around and declare that the founda tions of that context are rationally unfounded. If the premise that our senses give us accurate knowledge of reality has no basis in reason, then any argument that occurs within that context has no basis in reason eitherwhich includes your argument."
Skeptic: "I see your point, but I think I can convince you if you will only watch my demonstration."
Antiskeptic: "Any attempted proof will itself depend on the prior validity of sensory evidence, so you are again attempting the absurd."
Skeptic: "But there are such obvious cases of deceptive sensory appearance, it seems absurd to me to deny their existence. As I was about to demonstrate before, if I take this straight pencil and place it in ..."
Antiskeptic: "Straight pencil? How did you ascertain that it is straight and that it is a pencil?"
Skeptic: "It's quite obvious."
Antiskeptic: "I agree, but you must presuppose the ability of your senses to give you accurate knowledge of reality."
Skeptic: "I'll rephrase my argument. Here we have what appears to be a straight pencil, although I'll admit that I cannot prove it. Mind you, I'm not saying that it really is a straight pencil, but only that it appears to be so. Now when I place what appears to be a straight pencil in this glass of water ..."
Antiskeptic: "You mean, when you place what appears to be a straight pencil in what appears to be a glass of water. . . ."
Skeptic: "Have it your way. Anyway, as you can now witness, the pencil appears to be bent."
Antiskeptic: "Does it?"
Skeptic: "Well, you're not at a very good angle. Get down more level with the water line."
Antiskeptic: "Do you mean to say that your monumental disproof of the senses requires a certain angle?"
Skeptic: "Don't be smart, just look. You must admit that it now looks bent."
Antiskeptic: "Yes, although a better description would be 'disjointed.' " (Long pause.)
Skeptic: "Well?"
Antiskeptic: "Well what?"
Skeptic: "What do you think now?"
Antiskeptic: "I told you what I think the pencil does look 'bent' in water."
Skeptic: "Yes, go on." Antiskeptic: "With what?"
Skeptic: "With the conclusion, of course."
Antiskeptic: "But I already gave you my conclusion: the pencil does appear to be bent under water."
Skeptic: "But what about the contradiction?"
Antiskeptic: "A contradiction?"
Skeptic; "Yes. The pencil appeared to be straight, and now it appears to be bent. If I remove it from the water, it once again appears straight."
Antiskeptic: "I agree with you on that point."
Skeptic: "But that's a contradiction!" Antiskeptic: "It is?"
Skeptic: "Of course! How can the same pencil be straight and bent?"
Antiskeptic: "We didn't say that it is straight and bent; we merely said that it looks straight out of water and looks bent in water. Where is the contradiction?"
Skeptic: "But that must be a contradiction."
Antiskeptic: "The Law of Contradictionwhich is one of the basic laws of logicstates that an object cannot be A and non A at the same time and in the same respect. You're showing me a pencil that looks straight at one time and in one respect (out of water), but that looks bent at another time and in another respect (in water). You must remember the context. We are perceiving the pencil through two different mediums, air and water. Since light travels more slowly through water than through air, it takes longer for the light waves to reach our eyes from the submerged portion. What we are perceiving is not a contradiction, but simply a straight pencil that appears bent in a specific context, i.e., in water. No defender of sensory experience would claim that an object must appear the same in every situation, but this has no effect whatsoever on the validity of the senses. For example, if I placed the pencil in a glass of tar, would you then express surprise because part of the pencil had 'disappeared'? Would this show that we cannot trust our senses? On the contrary, it is through our senses that we understand that the pencil is submerged in tar, and it is through our senses that we discover that light will not penetrate tar. In other words, it is through our senses that we gather the information with which to explain why the same object appears differently under different conditions. We solve the alleged instances of 'sensory deception' through a further appeal to sensory evidence just as you must presuppose the validity of the senses in the very attempt to disprove the validity of the senses."
Skeptic: "Since you claim that I have not presented you with a legitimate instance of a contradiction, I will appeal to another version of this argument which will fulfill your requirements. If we feel the pencil while it is in water, it will feel straight. The pencil looks bent but feels straight at the same time and in the same respect, i.e., while it is in water. That should cinch my argument."
Antiskeptic: "No, because we are dealing with two different sense modalities, which again changes the context. Also, this demonstration, like all others, presupposes the validity of sense perceptionwhich renders your conclusion invalid. For example, in order for your alleged contradiction to be a contradiction, it must be true that we are seeing and feeling the same object. After all, if we were seeing and feeling different objects, you would not even raise the possibility of a contradiction. Now I must ask you how you know that you are seeing and feeling the same object?"
Skeptic: "It's very simple to see that we are dealing with the same pencil."
Antiskeptic: "Of course, but you must establish that you are seeing and feeling the same object without recourse to the senses. And this, I submit, is impossible. Furthermore, in order for you to maintain that we are receiving contradictory evidence, you must assume that two different sense modalities sight and touchcan furnish us with information concerning the same aspect of the same object. This raises the question: On what basis do you claim that there is a contradiction between 'feeling straight' and ''looking bent'?"
Skeptic: "I must say again that it seems quite obvious."
Antiskeptic: "If it seems obvious, it is only because our past experience has permitted us to make the correlation between what we see and how an object feels. Without this previous sensory evidence, no such correlation would be possible. Thus, your argument is unintelligible without presupposing the vali dity of sensory evidence."
Skeptic: "I don't understand what you're saying here. Are you claiming that there is no problem whatsoever in the example I have presented?"
Antiskeptic: "It depends on what you mean by a 'problem.' There is a kind of problem here, but it is scientific, not philosophical. Because there is a change in perception when the pencil is submerged in water, it calls for an explanation but this explanation, as I have pointed out, consists of appealing to more sensory evidence in order to establish why the pencil appears bent in water. A primitive man with no knowledge of light refraction may be genuinely puzzled by our phenomenon, but if he wishes to arrive at a solution, he can do so only through more research. For him to blame his senses, aside from being unjustified, would not solve or explain his dilemma.
"I would like to emphasize a major source of confusion in your argument against sense perception. To speak of our senses 'deceiving' us is, at best, a sloppy metaphor. Philosophically, it is nonsense. Our senses are simply physical organs with no will of their own. To say that they 'deceive' us makes no more sense than to claim that our hearts or our lungs 'deceive' us. Sense organs respond to physical stimuli from the external world; they have no capacity to deceive or misrepresent. They simply transmit sensations according to their physiological charac teristics, which our brains then automatically integrate into percepts. We may misinterpret the basic data given to us, but there can be no question about the validity of the data per se. For example, a man may see what he believes to be a lake in the middle of a desert, whereas what he actually sees is only a reflection of light waves off the sand, or, in other words, a mirage. The man is mistaken in his identification of the sensory evidencehe has not properly interpreted the data given to himbut his senses have not somehow 'deceived' him. The light waves that reach his eyes actually do exist, but the man's interpretation as to the causal origin of these waves is mistaken."
Skeptic: "It seems that you have opened the door for an entirely new set of objections against the senses. Even if our senses, properly speaking, do not 'deceive' us, how can we be sure that our interpretation of sensory evidence is correct? To use your example, how could the man in a desert decide if what he perceives is a real lake or merely a mirage?"
Antiskeptic: "By appealing to more sensory evidence. In this case, he may not be able to decide with certainty until he approaches the area where the lake is supposed to be and sees that there isn't one."
Skeptic: "But isn't it possible for me to doubt my interpre tation of sensory evidence in every instance? How can I ever be certain that what I identify as the object of my perception is in fact the actual object and not merely a mirage, illusion, or hallucination? Is it not possible to doubt that you are really sitting there, even though I am presented with the perception of a man? After all, you may be a mirage as well."
Antiskeptic: "This throws us into the problem of universal skepticism, which was refuted in the preceding section. Can you doubt every instance of sense perception? On a practical level, this is impossiblebut even if you were an exceptional person with the psychological capacity to doubt everything, your uni versal doubt would be blatantly irrational and self contradictory. To doubt every interpretation of sensory evidence is logically absurd.
"You must realize that to talk of deception, whether in the form of a mirage, illusion or hallucination, makes sense only in contrast to a wider context of nondeception. In order to say that one's interpretation of sensory evidence is incorrect, one must be able to distinguish incorrect from correct interpre tations. Otherwise, what would it mean to speak of mistaken identification? Mistaken as opposed to what? What would it mean, for example, to speak of counterfeit coins, unless in contradistinction to genuine coins?
Skeptic: "I understand your objection and I think I can respond to it. I won't deny that in order for us to identify incorrect interpretations of sensory evidence, we must be able to recog nize, in principle, a case of genuine interpretation. But my point is this: how, in any specific instance, can we be sure that we are correct? The man in the desert, after all, may have felt abso lutely certain that he was perceiving a lake, but he was wrong anyway. I may feel absolutely certain that I am perceiving you right now, but isn't it possible that I too am mistaken? It is perfectly conceivable that you are a figment of my imagination. Can you demonstrate to me that you are real and not merely a hallucination, or must I accept my interpretations on faith?"
Antiskeptic: "Your demand that I somehow prove to you that I am not an hallucination is totally inappropriate and unjustified. First of all, since you admit that you must be able to identify correct interpretations in order to distinguish incorrect interpre tations, simply apply your criteria to this specific instance. Here I am sitting next to you in plain view. You can see me, hear me, and even touch me if you wish. If these conditions do not qualify this as a case of genuine perception, I fail to see what conditions could possibly satisfy you. "Doubt is not justified merely on the grounds that you can somehow 'imagine' that you are mistaken. If in the face of such overwhelming evidence you wish to doubt the correctness of your judgment, then you must provide reasons for your doubt. If your skepticism is to be more than empty rambling, you must justify your doubt. This must consist of specifying why, in our particular circumstance, there is reason to suppose that our perceptual judgment is in error. Doubt cannot be applied indis criminately; it arises contextually in specific circumstances when there is reason to suppose that we may be mistaken.
"To illustrate the contextual nature of doubt, consider the case of the mirage. If we are in the middle of a desert on a very hot day, and if we see what appears to be a lake in the distance, I may say, 'There is a lake,' and you may reply, 'Perhaps not; you may be mistaken. It may be a mirage.' If I ask why you doubt that it is a lake, you may reply: 'Because light waves often reflect off of the desert sand and give the appearance of water. We are in a situation where this occurs quite frequently, so I have reason to doubt.' Or perhaps you are very familiar with the area and know for a fact that there is no lake, in which case you would not simply doubt my assertion, but would claim that I am positively mistaken. In either case, there is something about our specific situation that causes you to doubt the veracity of my perceptual identification. "Now suppose that we are in the middle of a forest and we stumble across a lake. We decide to take a swim and after an hour of splashing around, you suddenly declare, 'I doubt if this is a real lake.' Your doubt in this context would be utter nonsense. If I ask you why you doubt, and you reply, 'It's conceivable that I am having a hallucination,' I will press you further by asking, 'But what reasons do you have for supposing that you are hallucinating at this particular moment?' If you fail to offer reasons and merely assert that a hallucination is con ceivable, I will reply (without going into a detailed criticism of your use of 'conceivable' here) that you are uttering an unsup ported, arbitrary propositionand you do not deserve serious consideration until such time as you are prepared to offer arguments in support of your claim. "You see, then, that doubt is appropriate in some circum stances and inappropriate in others. It should be quite clear that your doubt of my existence is unfounded, and it must therefore be discarded as irrational. Our context is such that there is no reason to doubt our interpretations of sensory material. If you wish to cling to your doubt, you must offer reasonsreasons that pertain to this specific contextas to why doubt is necessary. If you fail to do so, then there is no reason why anyone should listen to you."
Skeptic: "You've covered this ground thoroughly, so I want to move to another (and in my opinion) more serious objection. You mentioned earlier that our senses operate according to a physiological process. Is this correct?"
Antiskeptic: "Yes, perception involves a causal chain of physiological events."
Skeptic: "Precisely. But all that we are immediately aware of is the end link of that causal chain. We are aware of percepts, but only as they present themselves to our consciousness, i.e., only as they interact with our sense organs. There is, for example, no such thing as sound existing independently of consciousness; it is simply the product of waves interacting with our ears. All of external reality is filtered through our senses before it reaches us, and this prevents us from ever perceiving reality accurately."
Anriskeptic: "There are two major flaws in your argument. First, it involves the original stolen concept of depending on communication which would be impossible if not for the assumption that we do perceive reality correctly. Second, I would like to ask you how we came to know of the causal chain involved in perception. After all, it is not selfevident."
Skeptic: "It was a scientific discovery."
Antiskeptic: "You mean to say, then, that it is an accurate, true discovery that describes the actual nature of sense perception?"
Skeptic: "Yes, of course."
Antiskeptic: "Then your use of the causal chain in perception commits you to the position that we perceive reality accurately, since you are claiming that this causal chain is objective fact and not merely an idea in your mind."
Skeptic: "But don't you agree that all we ever have direct awareness of is immediate sense data?"
Antiskeptic: "No. What we have direct awareness of is reality, and we are given this awareness through perception. Perception is our means of awareness, not the object of awareness. Every perception is perception of something. "You want to argue that we are aware only of ideas or perceptions in the mind rather than external reality. You then claim that we need to infer the existence of the external world using these perceptions as a starting point. I am arguing that no such inference is necessary. We have direct and immediate contact with reality through sense perception. "All that the causal nature of perception tells us is that perception necessarily entails a means of perception; certain causal conditions must be present before perception is possible, and once these conditions are satisfied, we have perception. Perception of what? There is only one possible answer: of reality. There is no other alternative. If your perceptions are not of reality, just what are they perceptions of?"
Skeptic: "They are perceptions of the interaction between the external world and my senses."
Antiskeptic: "No. The interaction causes the perception; the interaction is not the object of perception, but simply that which makes perception possible. Again, I must ask you, what is it that you are perceiving, if not reality?"
Skeptic: "I don't think I understand this argument." Antiskeptic: "I'll rephrase it somewhat. You claim that our senses, because of the physiological process involved in per ception, distort reality in some way. Correct?" Skeptic: "Yes."
Antiskeptic: "Now is this distortion caused by our particular sense organs1 mean, is there something peculiar about the sensory apparatus of man? or will there be distortion whenever there is perception, regardless of the nature of the organism involved?"
Skeptic: "Since all perception would involve a causal chain, there would doubtless be distortion regardless of the nature of the sense organs involved."
Antiskeptic: "So what you are actually telling me is this: While there may be a reality out there, unfortunately we can never see it because we have eyes, or we can never hear it because we have ears, or we can never smell it because we have noses. In other words, you consider sense organs to be an obstacle to per ception, rather than the means of perception. "You must remember that man is a physical organism who perceives through physical sense organs. These sense organs operate according to specific physiological processes determined by their natureand this must be true of any sensory apparatus, regardless of the organism involved. Where you have perception, there must be a means of perception. This is what makes perception possible. What you wish to claim, however, is that our means of perception is what invalidates perceptionthat any act of perceiving, by its very nature, is not really perception but distortion. Aside from the many stolen concepts in this line of thought, it strikes me as a blatantly absurd argument."
Skeptic: "Even if you are correct, there are other arguments against the senses."
Antiskeptic: "Yes, but they differ only in details, not in essen tials. No man can escape the fact that his knowledge is gained through sensory experience; all of his concepts, words and arguments depend on and presuppose this fact. Whenever a man opens his mouth to speakassuming that he intends to com municate intelligiblyhe is admitting the validity of sensory experience. All of the socalled arguments against the senses would not be possible without the prior assumption that our senses are reliable. The skeptic cannot avoid selfcontradiction."
Skeptic: "Even if I accept what you say, there is yet another problemand this one is raised quite frequently by Christians. I'll agree, as will many Christians, that we gain knowledge of reality through our senses, and that this knowledge is accurate. This does not prove, however, that our senses are our only method of perception. You want to limit knowledge to that which is gained through sensory experience, but this seems unjustifiably dogmatic. After all, the Christian claims that he gains knowledge of God, not through his senses, but through direct experience with the divine nature. As an atheist, you will not grant credence to his claim. But why? How do you know that we are limited to perception through our senses?"
Antiskeptic: "If the Christian has discovered a new means of perception, I am perfectly willing to listen to his claim, pro vided that he is willing to argue for his assertion. Perhaps man possesses perceptual powers of which he is presently unaware. I don't see any evidence for this, but I'll grant the possibility for the sake of argument. My argument with the Christian is that he claims to have experienced God, but he refuses to explain the process by which he, a physical organism, experienced this supernatural being. I won't limit him arbitrarily to the tra ditional five senses, but I will demand that he present evidence for his new perceptual powers. Has he discovered a new sense? Fine, then let him tell us about it so we can test it. "No Christian has ever succeeded in explaining just how he perceives his mysterious God. He claims to have knowl edge of a mysterious, unknowable being, having gained this knowledge in some mysterious, unknowable manner. This is totally unacceptable. "If the Christian wishes to be taken seriously, he must explain, not only what he claims to know, but how he claims to know it. If he did not acquire his knowledge through the senses, by what means did he acquire it? The burden of explanation lies with him. If he upholds his belief in the absence of rational grounds, then he is the dogmatist, not the atheist. The atheist simply wants to know what the theist believes in and how he acquired his knowledge. If explanations are not forthcoming, the atheist will remain an atheist."
From the beginning of this section of the book.
................................................................
George H. Smith ATHEISM The Case Against God
Chapter 4 Section 5 pages 147 to 162
Skepticism and Sense Perception
Perhaps the most concerted attack of skepticism is directed at the validity of sense perception. Sense perception constitutes the starting point, in effect, of knowledge, and to undercut the reliability of sensory evidence is to undercut the basis of man's knowledge. It comes as no surprise, therefore, that one will often find a Christian theologian (usually a Protestant) em ploying skeptical arguments against the senses to his advantage. If the atheist demands sensory evidence of God's existence, the Christian quickly points to the supposed unreliability of sense experience, while suggesting that God transcends such crass and ineffective methods of revealing himself. Instead, God chooses a purer way to reveal himself; the Christian experiences God directly, without the aid of intervening sense perception, and the Christian insists that the knowledge of God gained in this manner far surpasses the flimsy capacity of man's physical sense organs.
Atheism: The Case Against God
George H. Smith
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